NIST advances new wave of quantum-safe signature algorithms

Nine new candidates will advance in NIST’s effort to expand and diversify quantum-safe digital signatures

The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has identified nine candidate post-quantum cryptography (PQC) signature algorithms to advance to the third stage of testing.

Those that make it through the next phase will join the earlier standards - Dilithium, Falcon and SPHINCS+ - which were approved in 2024 as quantum-resistant alternatives to classical signature schemes such as RSA, ECDSA and EdDSA.

The aim is to give organisations a choice of signature systems based on different mathematical foundations, helping to hedge against advances in cryptanalysis and enabling them to swap schemes as needed — a concept known as cryptographic agility.

It is a rolling process.

“Algorithms will be replaced as time progresses, with some estimates suggesting there could be as many as five rounds of newly approved algorithms before we even reach the much-discussed Q-Day,” commented Simon Pamplin, CTO at network security vendor Certes.

“In that situation, you simply don’t have time to go back through a full cryptographic assessment process each time. You need a crypto-agile solution — one that can implement new algorithms in a single location and make them instantly available across all your applications and infrastructure, wherever they are.”

Two of the current standards - Dilithium and Falcon - are lattice-based, while SPHINCS+ is hash-based.

The new candidates (FAEST, HAWK, MAYO, MQOM, QR-UOV, SDitH, SNOVA, SQIsign and UOV) draw on different mathematical approaches, including multivariate, MPC-in-the-head, isogeny and code-based cryptography. They will now move into the third round of the selection process, which is expected to run for around two years, during which time the teams behind them will be able to make tweaks.

The new candidates are not simply alternatives - they must justify themselves, the institute noted in its report: “As NIST seeks to diversify its signature portfolio, submissions also needed to differ significantly from signature schemes that have already been selected by NIST for standardisation.”

PQC signature schemes generally have larger key and signature sizes than classical systems, which could affect performance in some scenarios. As a result, NIST is also looking for candidates that offer shorter signatures and faster verification, alongside strong security against both classical and quantum attacks.