That means that people automatically go to Google not just to search for something - web pages - but information that all ties together. Together, these separate services have become greater than the sum of their parts: maps, images, videos, pictures, and all presented in context, too.
Wanna run Gmail on your old Nokia Symbian smartphone? No problem, Google's got a good app for that. Yahoo hasn't.
But nor has Yahoo tested Ymail across the full range of browsers, or tested it over shonky wireless connections, or on sub-optimal equipment (or even just office PCs throttled by security software and other corporate-imposed performance restrictions).
Of course, it's unfair to damn a new CEO purely on the strength of his or her first six or so months in office.
But ploughing on with the "media company" strategy, as Mayer has asserted, is just a continuation of the failed strategy that saw Yahoo comprehensively eclipsed in the first place. There are any number of media companies that offer considerably better media than Yahoo, and it does not have the know-how or channels to market to be anything other than a niche player in media.
Instead, it needs to go back to its roots. It needs to re-establish its credentials as a search company and branch out from there - follow the Google template, then offer an alternative.
It needs to start providing some real competition to Google in the monopoly that Yahoo's insouciance and reluctance to defend the very business that it pioneered handed to Google.
After all, wasn't the real purpose of bringing Mayer on board at Yahoo (at no great expense) to bring with it all the distilled wisdom she learnt and applied at Google?
Indeed, if Yahoo really wanted to focus on "media", wouldn't it have made sense to have recruited someone from that sector instead?
By eliminating high entry costs for big data analysis, you can convert more raw data into valuable business insight.
A discussion of the "risk perception gap", its implications and how it can be closed