18 May 2006
A few years ago, I spent some time examining the phenomenon of "cyber-war": the prospect of using hacking activities, denial of service and tailored computer viruses to directly attack an enemy's information infrastructure.
Rather than fight a land, sea or air battle to conquer territory, the idea is instead to gain control over – or, perhaps, to damage irrevocably – an enemy's economy by attacking the systems that control its transport, distribution and financial capabilities.
It's a fascinating prospect. It allows an aggressor to launch an attack a long way from the physical borders of their target, so they are essentially safe from reprisal – and even safe from discovery in some cases. It takes only a small amount of effort for perhaps a huge reward in terms of the damage that can be done – the perfect tool for terrorists or for small nation-state aggressors.
Many aspects of national infrastructure are potentially vulnerable to such attacks, as they are increasingly computerised and networked. Rail transport systems in terms of computer-controlled signals and switches; air transport systems in a variety of ways; the banking industry, power generation, water and food distribution – all have potential weaknesses that could be interfered with.
Anyone who has ever done a penetration test on parts of what are termed the Critical National Infrastructure will attest to the many vulnerabilities they have discovered – vulnerabilities that in some cases are easy to pinpoint and to exploit. Why, then, have such attacks never been carried out?
First of all, this is not the right question. Such attacks have been performed, but not yet in a truly concerted manner. There have been various virus and denial-of-service attacks, and some amateurish hacking activity from China, for example, against US systems. But these have not constituted true " warfare" but rather almost nuisance attacks. Nor have there been any true terrorist attacks, though hacking skills have been exploited by terrorists in various ways.
The internet has been used as a communication and as an information resource – not as a vector for international conflict.
In part, this is not due to difficulties of gaining access to and control of computers, but rather the difficulties of exploiting that access and control in an aggressive manner. It needs an attacker not merely able to penetrate systems, but also able to understand how to manipulate controlled systems to cause lasting damage.
Of course that degree of understanding can be expected in due course – and
that threat places us computer users on the front line of any such net-war that
might develop.
Since it is our information infrastructure that interacts with the Critical
National Infrastructure – at very many levels – all users might become involved
in such a conflict. And the best way to avoid or to limit such a conflict is to
ensure that our systems remain secure. Good luck!
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